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CHAPTER 
King John’s Christmas cards: self-legitimation
King John was not a good man,
And no good friends had he.
He stayed in every afternoon . . .
But no one came to tea.
And, round about December,
The cards upon his shelf
Which wished him lots of Christmas cheer,
And fortune in the coming year,
Were never from his near and dear,
But only from himself.
A. A. Milne’s King John provides a metaphor, if an exaggerated
one, for the self-legitimation of government. In addition to the pic-
ture of legitimation frequently presented, as the means whereby
subjects and, ideally, subjects in a democracy, authorise govern-
ment, or rulers gain the consent of the ruled, legitimation is also an
activity carried on by rulers for their own beneﬁt, by the state for
and from itself. Legitimation is not only a circus for themass of sub-
jects, but also a private theatre for rulers, where they see their own
identity portrayed, conﬁrmed, and justiﬁed. The near and dear,
inasmuch as they are part of the community of rulers, will send
cards, but nobody else will. The larger part of the population will
not even know that the ceremonies are occurring. Rulers appear to
need to legitimate their power, to demonstrate constantly by rituals
both spiritual and secular their unique prestige, as persons autho-
rised in a manner that ordinary subjects are not, as persons set
apart to exercise the powers and privileges of government. This at-
tribution of apparent need rests neither on a deductive view of what
 A. A. Milne, Now We Are Six (London, Methuen,  ,  edn) p. .

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 Legitimating identities
rulers require, nor on an empirical psychology of rulers. Rather, as
with Weber, it is a matter of observing the regularity with which
rulers, of all kinds and in all kinds of regimes, engage in legitimation.
The attribution of need is therefore a hypothetical explanation of
observed behaviour, not a theory about governmental behaviour
with predictive aspirations. It depends upon the assumption that
if a group of people consistently behave in a certain way, that be-
haviour can reasonably be described as arising from need rather
than whim or contingency. It could, alternatively, be seen as a con-
stitutive need in the same way that animals need warm blood in
order to be mammals – without it they would not be mammals,
and the need is a need for certain characteristics or functions in
order to be one thing rather than another.
THREE GROUPS OF ACTORS
In the drama of legitimation there are three groups: custodians –
rulers, kings, presidents, prime ministers – all those engaged in
governing; cousins, the ‘near and dear’ – those who stand in a
privileged position in relation to the custodians without them-
selves actually governing; and subjects – the ordinary citizens,
voters, and people. Different identities are formed and operate
within the world of custodians, within the world of cousins, and
within the world of citizens. The world of cousins forms a medi-
ating one between custodians and citizens, inﬂuencing both and
drawing on the strengths of both. But a drama is acted out by the
custodians, in which ordinary citizens and subjects play no part,
and where the plot is constructed within a structure composed of
the needs, satisfactions and conventions of the private world of
government.
DEMOCRATIC AND MOST POST-WEBER THEORY ASSUMES
THAT LEGITIMATION IS ENGAGED IN BY CUSTODIANS AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF RULE
This attention to the world of rulers stands at some remove from
most recent political science. The prevailing use of the terms legiti-
mation and legitimacy is to indicate the conferring of authority on
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King John’s Christmas 
government by citizens, or the acceptance by citizens of the right of
government to rule because the appropriate criteria of efﬁciency,
or fairness, or probity, or representativeness have been met. The
activity described is of government as the recipient or beneﬁciary
of acts or beliefs of subjects, rather than an active and initiating
agent. And in so far as government does act, its actions are seen
not as part of the business of legitimation, but as the evidence upon
which the court of public opinionwill make its judgement about the
acceptability of the regime. Legitimation is the school report which
the electorate issues on the governmental term rather than one of
the distinguishing features of government itself. When legitima-
tion is seen to be a problem, it is a problem because government
has failed to fulﬁl the expectations of citizens, whether in the case
of conventional states, or in the case of international institutions
of governance such as the European Union.
There is both a theoretical and amethodological or practical rea-
son for the direction of attention away from the self-legitimation of
government. Political science, for much of the twentieth century,
and since the reaction against the elitism of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, has been a democratic discipline.
Normatively government has been justiﬁed by its representation of
the views, and protection and promotion of the interests, of citi-
zens. To give an account of normative activity within government
which seemed to owe little directly to public consent could seem
to confer approval on elites and to free them from the qualifying
test of public approval or consent. For the purposes of research,
it has been far easier to study the actions and opinions of citizens
 T. R. Gurr,Why Men Rebel (Princeton, Princeton University Press, ), p. ; Rodney
Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, Clarendon, ), pp. –, –; and
chapter  below.
 ‘“legitimacy” is just a suspension of withdrawal of consent’ and it ‘will no longer be granted if it
does not ﬁnd real corollaries in material interests’, Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social
Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, ), p. .
 See, for instance, SimonHix, ‘TheStudyof theEuropeanUnion II: the “newgovernance”
agenda and its rival’, Journal of European Public Policy ,  (), –.
 This objection is raised speciﬁcally in the case of the analysis of the state by Geoffrey
Marshall who argues that the concept of a coherent state has consequences for the
potential of such an institution to ﬂourish, and the ability of republicans to resist it: ‘for
Republicans the struggle to subject the executive to law begins with a conceptual struggle
to separate and clarify what the term “State” confuses’, Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional
Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press,  ), p. .
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 Legitimating identities
than the internal behaviour of government. The closer the centre
of power is approached, the more practice, convention, etiquette,
ideology and law narrow and impede the view. When government
has been seen therefore as itself engaged in legitimation, this activ-
ity has been perceived predominantly or exclusively, as it was by
Marx, as part of the ruling strategy of manipulating the people.
The ‘rites of rulers’, as analysed by Robert Goodin, are the cir-
cuses which government adds to the bread of welfare in order to
cultivate popular support. Goodin’s examination of these rites or
rituals signiﬁcantly slips from referring to them as rituals of rulers
to calling them political rituals, rituals which serve, in other words,
a persuasive function in the world of citizens and subjects. But the
rituals of rulers are also governmental rituals andmay, like themore
esoteric religious rituals, be carried out away from the public gaze.
Goodin’s discussion of the medieval European priesthood draws
attention to the way in which the withdrawal of the priest beyond
the rood screen to celebrate mass was a ritual expression of the
subordinate position of the peasantry, who were visibly excluded
from the ceremony. But were that all that was happening, and
were this simply or solely a means of expressing and reinforcing
the subordination of the laity, once the priest was removed from
the sight of the congregation he would need to do no more, but
wait for a time before reappearing. In fact, of course he did a very
great deal more, and the witness to the ceremony, if others were
there at all, was provided by other members of the priesthood and
immediate servants of the altar. The ‘secret’ ceremony was only
secret if one assumes that it was solely for public consumption. As
Peter Berger long ago pointed out, for legitimation to work, it has
to be more than a device to fool the masses. The practitioners have
to believe just as much as everyone else does; the ‘children must be
convinced, but so must be their teachers’.
 Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, pp. –.
 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Rites of Rulers’ in Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven and
London, Yale University Press, ).
 Ibid., p. .
 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City,
NY, Doubleday,  ), p.  . This is the opposite of the view taken by Jeremy Rayner,
who argues that in order to succeed, the leaders of belief have to encourage views which
they do not themselves hold: Jeremy Rayner, ‘Philosophy into Dogma: The Revival of
Cultural Conservatism’, British Journal of Political Science ,  (October ), –.
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LEGITIMATION OF RULERS, BY RULERS, FOR RULERS
What has frequently been ignored is that, as Weber pointed out,
legitimacy functions as self-justiﬁcation for the administrative per-
sonnel of government. It may well be, though he did not ar-
gue this, that this is the most important function and location of
legitimation. No party, faction, class or group, Weber suggested,
is ever content to control simply the coercive and administrative
means of government. There is in fact some ambiguity in Weber’s
own account here. One part of his argument certainly suggests that
legitimation is carried on because ‘custom, personal advantage,
purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a suf-
ﬁciently reliable basis for a given domination’. This utilitarian
function exists because ‘the basis of every authority, and corre-
spondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by
virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige’. But
two aspects of the argument are often neglected. First, that Weber
is here describing the relations between ‘the chief and his admin-
istrative staff ’, not those between rulers and ruled. Second, that
he elsewhere suggests that the activity of legitimation, whatever
its function in sustaining the solidarity of immediate subordinates,
also functions to sustain the ruler himself: ‘he who is more favoured
feels the never ceasing need to look upon his position as in some
way “legitimate”’. Some commentators have elided these var-
ious points, so that even the passage quoted above is presented
as an account of a purely instrumental function whereby rulers
 BeethamandLord suggest that ‘Analysts of political legitimacy fromMaxWeber onwards
have argued about whether the recognition or acknowledgement of a regime’s legitimacy
is only important to the behaviour of its elites or administrative staff, rather than of
subjects more widely’, David Beetham and Christopher Lord, Legitimacy and the European
Union (London, Longman, ), p. . But they do not develop the point, nor do they
sustain it with citation or discussion of work which has paid attention to legitimation
within elites. Beetham’s and Lord’s use of the words ‘recognition or acknowledgement’
is interesting. The main focus of their argument, as of Beetham’s own earlier argument,
is that legitimacy is an objective status earned by regimes, and earned principally though
not exclusively through their fulﬁlment of democratic criteria of representativeness and
procedure. To speak of ‘recognition or acknowledgement’ is not inconsistent with this,
but it does focus on the regime, rather than on the procedures, context, or history which
in Beetham’s and Lord’s terms, justiﬁes it.
 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.),  vols.
(London, University of California Press, ), vol. I, p. .
 Ibid., p. . Ibid., p. . Ibid., p. .
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 Legitimating identities
sustain the obedience of the mass of their subjects. Joseph Berger
and Morris Zelditch write that
The supposedly most powerful actor in society is, in fact, dependent on
the subordinates who actually control the facilities of force. Their loyalty
might be bought with side payments, and the larger population bought
with promises of beneﬁts, but inducements are also unstable in the long
run. The value of inducements depends on the preferences of the subor-
dinates, which vary over actors and across time. Hence, every system of
domination attempts to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy.
Weber’s point is glossed by the incorporation of his words into
Berger’s and Zelditch’s own text, but with the addition of the word
‘hence’. But the seemingly ubiquitous priority given to this activ-
ity, the activity of legitimation, deserves attention. Equal attention,
and by way of compensation for relative neglect even greater atten-
tion, needs to be given to one other vital feature of Weber’s origi-
nal comments. Weber wrote of ‘the claims of obedience made by
the master against the “ofﬁcials” and of both against the ruled’.
Legitimation is an activity, in other words, carried on within gov-
ernment. And not only is legitimation carried out by government,
it is frequently carried out for government, and for the private sat-
isfaction of government rather than for its public acclaim. There is
an observable and universal need to justify the possession of gov-
ernment by claiming legitimacy. ‘The fortunate is seldom satisﬁed
with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that
he has a right to his good fortune . . .Good fortune thus wants to
be “legitimate” fortune.’ ‘Simple observation shows that in ev-
ery such situation he who is more favored feels the never ceasing
need to look upon his position as in some way “legitimate”, upon
his advantage as “deserved”, and the other’s disadvantage as being
brought about by the latter’s “fault”.’DrawingonWeber amongst
others, Dolf Sternberg appeared to have no doubts on the matter.
‘Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is
 Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, Status, Power and Legitimacy (London, Transaction
Books, ), p.  .
 Weber, Economy and Society, p. .
 Weber in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London,
), p.  .
 Weber, Economy and Society, p. .
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King John’s Christmas 
exercised both with a consciousness on the government’s part that
it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed
of that right.’ The word ‘some’ is of greater signiﬁcance than the
ranking of the parties. Applying this observation to the rulers of
imperial Rome, Paul Veyne comments that this ‘tendency of the
sovereign’s to express his majesty is no more rational than his need
to justify himself: themeans are not proportionate to the ends. Justi-
ﬁcation and expression lend themselves secondarily to ideological
use or to “machiavellian” rationalisations, but they are not pri-
marily weapons’ . . . ‘the king wants to satisfy himself and has little
notion of the effects his ostentation produces on the spectator’.
As David Kertzer comments, ‘In order to invest a person with
authority over others, there must be an effective means for chang-
ing the way other people view that person, as well as for changing
the person’s conception of his right to impose his will on others.’
His own conception of himself appears to be an essential element
in the business. Veyne’s comparison of non-rational legitimation
with ‘“machiavellian” rationalisations’ is illuminatingly inappro-
priate. Machiavelli’s own account of the aims of rulers places just
such apparently non-rational or non-utilitarian goals to the fore.
Rulers seek not wealth or material comfort, but prestige, greatness,
and honour. Some of the actions of rulers can be explained in
terms of the desire for tangible goods. But that does not give a
sufﬁcient explanation. And whilst it may provide important clues
to marginal changes – which may be of great signiﬁcance in their
consequences – it cannot explain the choice of rule, as against the
choice of banking or ballet. The analysis of powermust share dissat-
isfactions with mere or narrow utilitarianism which are analogous
to those felt by John Stuart Mill.
The need for self-justiﬁcation amongst rulers seems universal.
When Henry III spent the equivalent of two entire years’ royal in-
come on creating Westminster Abbey as a declaration of both the
 Dolf Sternberg, ‘Legitimacy’ in The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. IX,
pp. – (New York, ), p. .
 Paul Veyne, Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism, trans. Brian Pearce
(London, Penguin, ), p. .
 David L. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven and London, Yale University
Press, ), p. .
 Niccolo` Machiavelli, The Prince ([] Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, ).
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 Legitimating identities
sanctity of Edward the Confessor and the legitimation by associa-
tion of his own kingship, the likely audience was a tiny fragment
of the population. As Paul Binski comments on the architectural
and iconographic demonstration of royal legitimation which the
abbey constituted, the manifestation was ‘not to some notional
“public”, but rather to the community which produced it in the
ﬁrst place’. And the most important receiver of the sacramen-
tal royal message was perhaps the king himself. Even when such
religious construction or ritual was publicly displayed, as when
Henry V spent almost as much on the reburial of Richard II as
he had spent on the funeral of his own father who had usurped
Richard, the public was limited, and the most privileged ob-
server was Henry himself. As Paul Strohm comments, ‘Well might
a Lancastrian, besieged by apparitions and rumors, hope to close
the troubled space of their origin by returningRichard to his proper
grave. Henry V’s decision to effect this return is here treated not as
an isolated act of piety but as a positive political stratagem – a form
of symbolic struggle which addressed (though it could not settle)
continuing problems of Lancastrian legitimation.’ But problems
for whom? Such endogenous, regnal self-legitimation is not an ac-
tivity peculiar to either monarchy or the European middle ages.
At the end of the twentieth century, the Iraqi President Sadam
Hussein possessed many presidential palaces. But the only occa-
sion on which they were entered by the people of Iraq was dur-
ing  when those ordinary subjects were brought in to deter
American and British air raids. Presidential palaces are to impress
presidents, not subjects. Nor is the seclusion of palaces and their
reservation for the ruler and his immediate entourage a feature
peculiar to despotic or undemocratic regimes. The degree of seclu-
sion will differ markedly, but even the rulers of the most politi-
cally egalitarian regimes will have their distinctiveness marked by
the buildings which they use. Harold Lasswell and Merritt Fox
contrast autocratic separation, the Forbidden City or the Kremlin
 Paul Binski,Westminster Abbey and the Plantagenets (NewHaven, YaleUniversity Press, ),
p.  .
 Ibid., p. .
 Paul Strohm, England’s Empty Throne: Usurpation and the Language of Legitimation,  – 
(London, Yale University Press, ), pp. –.
 Ibid., p. .
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under both tzars and communism, with popular government in the
United States:
The sharpest contrast to despotism and autocracy is a well-established
popular government. The ofﬁcial meets the citizen on a common level
and the chief of state lives with an insigniﬁcant physical barrier separating
him from his fellows. TheWhite House inWashington expresses the basic
relationship that connects the transitory holder of the presidential ofﬁce
and the rank and ﬁle of the nation. The White House is neither remote
nor exalted; it has the approachability of a private home.
But the White House is clearly far more ‘exalted’ than the average
American home, and signiﬁcantly less approachable. The citizens
of the United States may visit and be impressed by the White
House once or even several times in a lifetime, but the president
can be impressed by it, and what it says about the incumbent of the
presidential ofﬁce, every day. According to Edelman,‘That a man
meets with his aides in theOval Ofﬁce of theWhite House reminds
him and them and the public to whom the meeting is reported of
his status and authority as President, just as it exalts the status of
the aides and deﬁnes the mass public as nonparticipants who never
enter the Ofﬁce.’
There is a substantial literature in political psychology on the in-
ternal or personal satisfactions of power, which I have not touched
upon, and whose concerns, though relevant to the wider discussion
of power and legitimation, lie on the borders of what I deal with
here. Harold Lasswell saw leadership as arising from the need
to work out private problems in public places, Erik Erikson con-
sidered leadership as a conjunction of personal history and social
situation. But it is possible to speculate about the nature of any
 Harold D. Lasswell and Merritt B. Fox, The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and
Policy (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, ), p. .
 They can now visit a virtual White House whenever they wish, and tour its public spaces.
www.whitehouse.gov/. Circuses have been replaced by vdus.
 Murray Edelman, ‘Space and the Social Order’, Journal of Architectural Education , 
(November ), – , p. .
 See, for instance, Robert E. Lane, ‘ExperiencingMoney and Experiencing Power’, in Ian
Shapiro and Grant Reeher (eds.), Power, Inequality, and Democratic Politics: Essays in Honour of
Robert A. Dahl (Boulder and London,Westview Press, ); David C.McClelland, Power:
the Inner Experience (New York, Irvington Publishers, ).
 Dankwart A. Rustow (ed.), Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York, George
Braziller, ).
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‘need’ for self-legitimating identity cultivation without crossing into
psychology. Rulers can be depicted as seeking ethical or perceptual
coherence, a ﬁt between their account of themselves, and their
other actions. This search for coherence, whilst it might be investi-
gated in terms of its psychological dimension, can be described also
as a feature of the actions of rulers. Inis Claude remarks illuminat-
ingly that ‘power holders are burdened, like other human beings,
by the necessity of satisfying their own consciences. By and large,
they cannot comfortably regard themselves as usurpers or tyrants
but require some basis for convincing themselves of the rightness of
their position.’ It can be suggested that such legitimation serves
to consolidate ruling groups, providing the self-justiﬁcation that
enables elites to function, not with the consent of their subjects, but
with the consent of their own conception of themselves and their
social and governmental identities.
The effort devoted to legitimation within the community of gov-
ernors is a feature of the effort to cultivate an appropriate identity.
Because the identity of rulers is of greatest importance to rulers
themselves, the cultivation of governing identity, the legitimation
of rule, becomes more important the further up the governmental
tree one climbs. Legitimation is the legitimation of an activity by
describing, cultivating, and identifying it and its actor in a partic-
ular way: the more that people engage in the activity, the more
legitimation they are likely to engage in. This account of legiti-
mation and its location is consonant with Weber’s conception of
elective afﬁnity: the legitimating ideas and concepts are adopted,
reﬁned, and cultivated with a vigour relative to the extent to which
the person or group is engaged in the activity of governing, and
has therefore the interests which go with that occupation. But one
can also observe that the more demanding the activity, the more
 Inis L. Claude, Jr, ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United
Nations’, International Organization  (), –, p. .
 Ibid.: ‘How was system integration sustained in imperial societies? Three sets of factors
seem most important: the use of coercive sanctions, based on military power; the legiti-
mation of authority within ruling elites, making possible the establishment of an administra-
tive apparatus of government; and the formation of economic ties of interdependence’;
Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London, Macmillan,
 ), p. : ‘This is not to say that the legitimation of power was unimportant in the
system integration of imperial societies; but its signiﬁcance is to be found primarily in
terms of how far it helped to consolidate the ruling apparatus itself.’
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009Downloa ed from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.197.39 on Wed Jan 04 15:36:39 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490163.003
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
King John’s Christmas 
necessary the legitimation. And governing is a far more time-
consuming (though not necessarily more onerous) activity than be-
ing governed. Amongst the various forms of political legitimation,
the legitimation carried out by rulers is the most important – and
it is accorded by them to themselves.
This endogenous regnal self-legitimation of rulers in their own
eyes and for their own consumption is a major feature of govern-
ment, and a minor feature of politics. It is, in an amendment of the
Gettysburg phrases, legitimation of government, by government,
and for government. To ignore this is to ignore a major feature
of all government. The proper and desirable wish of political sci-
entists to establish normative criteria for assessing government, to
do so in conjunction with the procedures of democracy, and hence
to present legitimation as a public communication between rulers
and ruled has been accompanied by a neglect of another world of
legitimation. This diversion of attention is sustained, or not chal-
lenged, by the behaviour of government itself. The way in which
government sets about legitimating itself contributes to this lacuna
in political science, since legitimation, however much it may have
a public face, is in the ﬁrst place carried on relatively privately. It
is in the ﬁrst place for the beneﬁt of rulers, not of subjects, and is
pursued in the sight of rulers, not in the sight of the ruled. It can
be argued that legitimation is necessary to subjects not to cause
them to obey, but to enable them to obey. But it may be equally
necessary to enable rulers to issue commands by conﬁrming them
in their belief that they have the authority to do so, that they act in
a way which conﬁrms and cultivates their particular legitimating
identity as rulers.
LEGITIMATION OF RULERS IN THEIR OWN EYES
For the legitimation which is carried out, initiated, and directed by
rulers, the rulers themselves are the principal audience. Even when
recognition is cultivated in others, it ismost actively sought from the
rulers’ own immediate associates, institution, or community. The
principal focus of the activity of legitimation is the rulers them-
selves. It is for their own self-deﬁnition, rather than for their justiﬁ-
cation in the eyes of their subjects, that legitimation is principally
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conducted. A royalmarriagemay be, as Bagehot put it, the brilliant
edition of a universal fact, but rulers may seek a conﬁrmation of
this distinctiveness out of the public gaze as well as in it. It is not only
Pharisees who thank God that they are not as other men. Peter
Burke, in his account of the legitimation of Louis XIV, comments
that one of the audiences was posterity. It could be argued in de-
velopment of this point that a concern for posterity is a concern for
one’s own survival, an attempt to reassure oneself thatmortality can
be transcended. Certainly, impressing posterity does not contribute
to the grip on power of the living. As Burke elsewhere observes, the
effects of legitimation need to be considered, ‘not least on the king
himself ’ who, after all, amidst the wealth of iconography, ‘saw
himself everywhere, even on the ceiling’. The function of cere-
mony in conﬁrming the sense of the principal actor of his or her
authority can be detected as readily in twentieth-century France as
under the monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Franc¸ois Mitterand consulted experts on the rituals and symbols
of the revolution of  when planning his own presidential in-
auguration in  . However many or few might appreciate the
signiﬁcance of the resulting ceremonial detail, the new president
would do so. The difference was in this respect not great between a
president, and a king for whom the ‘panegyrics in prose and verse
were addressed in the ﬁrst place to an audience of one, the king
himself ’. Paul Veyne comments of the justiﬁcatory displays of
imperial Rome that the ruler ‘is ready to proclaim his own glory
even if nobody is listening’. Sometimes even the presidents and
princes may have difﬁculty gaining effective sight or experience of
the artefacts of legitimation. But they know they are there, whereas
 Quoted in David Cannadine, ‘Introduction: Divine Rites of Kings’ in David Cannadine
and Simon Price (eds.), Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,  ), p. .
 Luke ,  .
 Peter Burke,The Fabrication of Louis XIV (NewHaven, Yale University Press, ), p. .
 Ibid., p.  .
 Ibid., p.  .
 Sean Wilentz, ‘Introduction: Teufelsdro¨ckh’s Dilemma: On Symbolism, Politics, and
History’ in Sean Wilentz (ed.), Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual and Politics Since the Middle
Ages (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, ), p. .
 Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, p. .
 Veyne, Bread and Circuses, p. .
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for the population as a whole they may be, by their location or their
very character, inaccessible. Veyne writes of the effectively invisi-
ble frieze celebrating, on Trajan’s column, the emperor’s military
triumphs in Dacia, ‘Archaeologists examine this frieze with binoc-
ulars. We may doubt whether Trajan’s subjects paid much more
attention to it.’
One of the ways in which rulers legitimate themselves is by the
construction or development of physical environments which ex-
press and conﬁrm their governing identity. Leaders surround them-
selves with objects which ‘acknowledge’ their importance. Louis
XIV was frequently portrayed in the midst of ‘a whole cluster
of digniﬁed or dignity-bestowing properties such as orbs, scep-
tres, swords, thunderbolts, chariots and various kinds of military
trophy’. The juxtaposition of people with objects ‘proclaims’
authority. It might seem that such activity is invalid unless car-
ried out in the public gaze, and that privacy negates the exercise.
The reverse is the case. It follows from the logic of such legiti-
mation that other people should not be in juxtaposition with the
legitimating objects, or at least not at the same time as the leader. It
is the objects which announce authority, and if the leaders shared
that juxtaposition with others, the announcement would either be
sharedwith them, or be evaporated andmeaningless.The verybath
water of the West African kings of Akuapem is specially disposed
of, to prevent mere ordinary humans using it and hence acquiring
something of the distinctiveness of royalty. Only if the leaders
can be seen in exclusive proximity to the authority acknowledging
objects can the magic still work. So when kings of Akuapem were
enthroned, or enstooled, the ritual took place beyond the public
view. The articulation and enactment of their special character was
conducted in private. English kings and queens, though crowned
before witnesses, were similarly anointed in the view of God alone.
What is the peculiar contribution of objects and the manufac-
tured world to legitimation? Cannot people, subjects, acknowledge
 Ibid., p.  .
 Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, p. .
 Michelle Gilbert, ‘The Person of the King: Ritual and Power in a Ghanaian State’ in
Cannadine and Price (eds.), Rituals of Royalty, p. .
 Ibid.
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authority? They can, but they are neither so malleable nor so reli-
able as objects, nor so permanently on call. TheWiltonDiptych, the
devotional painting which formed part of the portable possessions
ofRichard II, ‘served to focusRichard’s ownmeditation, to re-enact
his devotion, whether he was present or not, to proclaim to himself
the certainty of his prospective welcome in Heaven, and ﬁnally, to
reinforce his idea of earthly kingship under heavenly protection’.
The diptych was for private, not public display, but was an asser-
tion for the king of his authority and his unique status in relation to
God and man. Paul Binski comments on Richard’s devotion to the
royal shrinewhichWestminster Abbey had become, that it reﬂected
‘the peculiar anxieties of an insecure, fastidious and hypersensitive
young king’. The assuaging of royal anxieties was for the king
alone. It was his doubts that were calmed, his sense of authority
that was conﬁrmed. His consciousness, not that of his subjects, was
the focus. The rituals of power, fromVersailles to Nuremberg, from
Delhi toWashington, however much they may impress the subjects
and citizens of their regimes, impress the rulers at least as much. A
triumphal entry into Romemay have been accompanied by a whis-
pered reminder, ‘Remember you are mortal’, but the triumphal
quotidian life of rulers is accompanied by the far louder statement,
‘Remember you are not like others.’
The secret garden of government
The public, though they may be an audience, have never been the
principal audience in the theatre of endogenous legitimation, of the
‘courtly rituals which are unknown to or unobserved by the major-
ity of the population’ and which coexist with public displays. The
 Lucy Freeman Sandler, ‘The Wilton Diptych and Images of Devotion in Illuminated
Manuscripts’ in Gillian Gordon, Lisa Monnas, and Caroline Elam (eds.), The Regal Image
of Richard II and the Wilton Diptych (London, Harvey Miller Publishers, ), p. .
 Binski, Westminster Abbey and the Plantagenets, p. .
 ErnstH.Kantorowicz,TheKing’s TwoBodies (Princeton, PrincetonUniversity Press,  ),
p. .
 Ibid., Kantorowicz quotes Francis Bacon on this point, to the effect that the two precepts
‘Memento quod es homo’ and ‘Memento quod es deus, or vice Dei’ between them check the power
and the will of kings, p. . But the checks imposed by the ﬁrst are balanced by the
power which comes from the authorising identiﬁcation of oneself as unique.
 Cannadine, ‘Introduction: Divine Rites of Kings’, p. .
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‘theatre state’ of Bali described by Clifford Geertz, with its massive
emphasis on spectacle and ceremony, where ‘Power served pomp,
not pomp power’, was not an exotic oddity, but simply an extrav-
agant point on a single continuum. Sydney Anglo comments on
the arrival of Henry VII in London after the Battle of Bosworth,
that it was ‘for the great majority of ordinary folk who made up the
cheering roadside throng on the way to the capital, probably the
last time that they ever saw their monarch in the ﬂesh’. Hence
‘One of the greatest obstacles barring the way to a sensible ap-
preciation of the ways in which Renaissance rulers were perceived
by their contemporaries is that we know a great deal more about
these kings and queens than did even the best informed of their
subjects. It is true that we cannot hear their voices, interview them
or see them in the ﬂesh: but in these respects we are no worse off
than all but their tiny circle of intimates.’ This was not an acci-
dental or random effect. Government is a secret garden, and its
ceremonies, rituals, and life both exceptional and mundane serve
tomark off even its most egalitarian practitioners from those whom
they rule. Themessage is an externally directed one but, evenmore
importantly, an internally directed one, conﬁrming the legitimating
identity of the ruling group. TerenceRanger andOlufemiVaughan
comment that the ‘need for rulers to be conﬁdent in their own legit-
imacy and to deﬁne their relationswith othermembers of the ruling
group underlies those “secret” rituals of kingship of which the gen-
eral population of African states often seem to be ignorant’. The
 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, ), p. . Though Gordon Kipling has drawn on Geertz’s concep-
tions to draw conclusions with a different emphasis for medieval Europe: ‘The pageants
may, indeed, “ﬂatter and cajole” the prince, but their primary purpose lay in celebrating
and renewing the communal political bond which united the sovereign and his peo-
ple’, Gordon Kipling, Enter the King: Theatre, Liturgy and Ritual in the Medieval Civic Triumph
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, ), p.  .
 It is one, too, which received ﬁctional depiction over a quarter of a century before Geertz
employed it as a means of anthropological explanation. The world described by Mervyn
Peak in his ﬁrst two Gormenghast novels is precisely driven by the need to continue
and enact ceremony. Mervyn Peake, Titus Groan (London, Eyre and Spotiswood, );
Gormenghast (London, Eyre and Spotiswood, ).
 Sydney Anglo, Images of Tudor Kingship (London, B.A. Seaby, ), p. .
 Ibid., p.  .
 Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan, ‘Introduction’ in Terence Ranger and Olufemi
Vaughan (eds.), Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A. H.M.
Kirk-Greene (London, Macmillan, ), p. .
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message of ritual and ceremony can be disseminated not just by
formal, institutional distinctions, but by the entire culture of rule.
As Benedict Anderson observes of pre-colonial Java, ‘Although the
ruling class of traditional Java could be deﬁned in structural terms
as the hierarchy of ofﬁcials and their extended families, like any
other ruling class they were also marked off – indeedmarked them-
selves off – from the rest of the population by their style of life and
self-consciously espoused system of values.’ The use of expert
languages, for instance, whetherMandarin or managerial strategic
military jargon, serves both to exclude the bulk of the population
from the exchange, and to indicate to the users of the language
their special status, their particular identity and justiﬁcation. The
elaborate ritual codes of theT’ang dynasty inChinawere the key to
ceremonial events which, though theymight on occasion have pub-
lic spectators, were in the ﬁrst place the preserve of a ruling elite.
In a society as apparently open and public as nineteenth-century
Britain, its royal rituals could still have an essentially private char-
acter: ‘great royal ceremonials were not so much shared, corporate
events as remote, inaccessible group rites, performed for the beneﬁt
of the few rather than the ediﬁcation of themany’. Evenwhen the
legitimating message is ostensibly public, the manner of its trans-
mission, and the limited nature of the public, canmake it an almost
private communication. The audience of ‘privy councillors, court
hangers-on, continental observers, university scholars, and British
clerics’ described by Lori Ferrell for the sermons emanating from
the court of James I &VI was quite select. Even funerals could be
occasions for such enactments, as Jennifer Woodward comments
 Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, ‘The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture’ in Claire Holt (ed.),
with the assistance of Benedict R. O’G. Anderson and James Siegel, Culture and Politics in
Indonesia, – (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, ), p. .
 David McMullen, ‘Bureaucrats and Cosmology: The Ritual Code of T’ang China’ in
Cannadine and Price (eds.), Rituals of Royalty.
 David Cannadine, ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British
Monarchy and the “Invention of Tradition”, c. – ’ in Eric Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, pp. – (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, ), p.  . Interestingly, the illustration on the cover of the paper-
back edition of The Invention of Tradition shows just such an ‘inaccessible group rite’, the
presentation of a dead stag by Albert to Victoria and her children, by ﬂaming torch light,
at a door to Balmoral.
 Lori Anne Ferrell, Government by Polemic: James I, the King’s Preachers, and the Rhetorics of
Conformity, – (Stanford, Stanford University Press, ), p.  .
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of the royal obsequies of Renaissance England: ‘By taking part
in the procession each individual acknowledged and enacted his
relative status in society.’ Pierre Bourdieu, discussing the educa-
tional recruitment, and selection, of the twentieth-century French
elite, argues that ceremonies and procedures of initiation transform
‘the representation that the invested person has of himself, and the
behaviour he feels obliged to adopt in order to conform to that
representation’. But it is not only in the entry into an elite, but
in the entire subsequent life of its members, that their identity is
legitimated, and their identiﬁcation legitimates their position.
Writing of the Soviet Union before , Joseph Schull com-
ments on the importance of ideology not as a means of commu-
nicating with or persuading the mass of the population, but as a
means of legitimating governing elites in their own eyes:
The masses were simply not the audience to whom political claims were
legitimated. In these societies, ideology was essentially the language of
political elites who constrained each other to obey its conventions.When the
leaders of these societies used ideology to legitimate some claim, they were
speaking to their colleagues as the co-tenants of ideological orthodoxy, not
to the population at large. This is not to say that Marxism-Leninism was
not propagated to the masses in such societies. Of course it was, but this
was not the arena in which ideological discourse (as opposed to propaganda)
was taking place.
Schull could equally well have been writing of Louis XIV, of
whose copiously produced iconography Peter Burke commented
that it was ‘unlikely that it was intended for the mass of Louis’
subjects’. As Norbert Elias commented on the court of Louis,
and on courts in general, ‘The practice of etiquette is, in other
words, an exhibition of court society to itself. Each participant,
above all the king, has his prestige and his relative power posi-
tion conﬁrmed by others . . .The immense value attached to the
demonstration of prestige and the observance of etiquette does not
 Jennifer Woodward, The Theatre of Death: The Ritual Management of Royal Funerals in Renais-
sance England,  – (Woodbridge, Boydell Press,  ), p. .
 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Ray-
mond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, Polity,  ), p. .
 Joseph Schull, ‘What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type
Societies’, Political Studies ,  (December ), – , p.  .
 Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, p.  .
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betray an attachment to externals, but to what was vitally impor-
tant to individual identity.’ Many of the rituals of kingship and
its creation have been in this way, as David Cannadine remarks,
‘unknown to or unobserved by the majority of the population’.
Architecture can be a powerful expression of such political facts
and political aspirations. The character of capital cities, the style of
their buildings and the construction of the spaces which link them,
can forcefully express the claims of government. Chandigarh, the
state capital of the Indian Punjab, despite being part of a formal
democracy, said more about the independent authority of rulers
than about the rights or participation of citizens, with ‘pedestrian
resistant’ expanses of plaza. Brası´lia, similarly, was constructed
in a way which ‘effectively discouraged mass involvement’. As
Murray Edelman put it, ‘Settings not only condition political acts.
They mold the very personalities of the actors.’ Space, and the
guarding and marking of space, pronounced to those who could
enter or occupy the forbidden cities of government that they were
marked off from ordinary people. The very difﬁculty and compli-
cation of reaching the king, or the president, or the prime minister,
the layers of courts and courtiers through which it was necessary to
pass, proclaimed to those who were in the inner sanctum or who
were given access to it, how exceptional they were.
LEADERS AND IMMEDIATE FOLLOWERS
The persons exercising governing power can be variously
described: as ruler or rulers, as governing elite, as the entire person-
nel of the state. A frequent and useful distinction is that between the
relatively small number of people who either directly or indirectly
command the system of government, and the mass of the popula-
tion.Weber, for instance, speaks of ‘the chief and his administrative
 Norbert Elias,The Court Society, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford, Blackwell, ), p.  .
 Cannadine, ‘Introduction: Divine Rites of Kings’, p. .
 Lawrence J. Vale, Architecture, Power and National Identity (NewHaven: Yale University Press,
), p. .
 Ibid., p.  .
 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (London, University of Illinois Press, ),
p. ; ‘We should expect, then, that a person’s values, style of life and of political action,
and expectation of others’ roles would be shaped by his social setting, symbolic and
nonsymbolic’, p. .
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staff ’, and contrasts them with ‘subjects’, and though his examples
aremilitary – ‘bodyguards, Pretorians, “red” or “white” guards’ –
the concept can apply equally to an administrative or bureaucratic
elite. But a distinction can be made within a distinction, not only
between the ruling group and the ruled, but within the ruling group
between leader and immediate supporters and staff. In autocratic
regimes where there are no settledmechanisms for changing rulers,
and where such change will occur only through coup or rebellion,
the boundaries between ruler and staff will blur. In representa-
tive electoral systems with distinctive bureaucracies the distinction
within the governing elite will be clearer. Whilst the ofﬁcials may,
particularly at themost senior levels, be partisan appointments who
change when governments change in response to electoral choices,
there will frequently be a larger or smaller relative number of ofﬁ-
cials whose tenure is not dependent on the results of elections, who
display a degree of non-partisan neutrality, and whose loyalty is
to an identity – professional, constitutional, national, professional,
state – distinct from that of party.
But the distinction between ruler and immediate staff is equally
valid for regimes formally governed by a single ruler. No one can
rule alone, andgovernment is in all cases anactivity carriedout by at
least one hierarchy and frequently several overlapping hierarchies
of governors who, whatever their ostensible status as leaders, ad-
ministrative staff, soldiers, or advisers, are all engaged in a common
enterprise. Whether the regime is representative and democratic,
monarchic, or a one-party autocracy, rulers need to legitimate
themselves not only in their own eyes, but in the eyes of their imme-
diate staff, whilst ruler and staff collectively need to legitimate them-
selves to themselves. However the differentiation is applied, four
aspects of legitimation are observable.Rulers are legitimating them-
selves in their own eyes; at the same time they are legitimating them-
selves in the sight of their immediate supporters – administrators,
advisers, military leaders; the governing community is legitimating
itself collectively in its own eyes; and the governing community is
legitimating itself in the eyes of ordinary subjects. ‘When legitima-
tion comes from the top’, Guiseppi di Palma argues, ‘the decisive
operative relationship is not that between rulers and people, but
 Weber, Economy and Society, p. .
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that between rulers and Weber’s administrative staff – in commu-
nist parlance, the cadres’. The point is similar to one made by
T. H. Rigby, also talking about communist European systems of
government before , when he writes that ‘even in cases where
the system of rule is so assured of dominance that its claim to legiti-
macy plays little or no part in the relationship between rulers and
subjects, the mode of legitimation retains its signiﬁcance as the ba-
sis for the relation of authority between rulers and administrative
staff and for the structure of rule’. The observation can be applied
equally to the case ofChina underMaoXedong, ofwhichFrederick
Teiwes comments that ‘the acceptance of the leader’s legitimacy by
his high-ranking colleagues is the crucial factor for survival in Lenin-
ist systems’. In regimes with ‘princes’ of one kind or another, the
loyalty of courtiers is essential, and systematically cultivated, in a
way that that of ordinary subjects may not be. Nor are princes
conﬁned to monarchies. The method of addressing Mao Xedong
bore strong similarities to the method of addressing emperors, as
the prostrate prose of the defence minister addressing his leader
in  illustrates: ‘I am a simple man . . . and indeed I am crude
and have not tact at all. For this reason, whether this letter is of
reference value or not is for you to decide. If what I say is wrong,
please correct me.’
But whilst relations within the sphere of government may be
of primary importance, distinctions within the sphere of govern-
ment are conversely of far less signiﬁcance than distinctions be-
tween the community of governors and the rest of the popula-
tion. If rulers and those immediate followers and administrators
who participate in their rule employ human mirrors for their self-
creation, they provide those mirrors for each other as much as they
seek them amongst the mass of citizens, voters, or subjects. The
 Guiseppe Di Palma, ‘Legitimation From the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural
Change in Eastern Europe’, World Politics ,  (October  ), –, p.  .
 T. H. Rigby, ‘Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-
organisational Systems’ in T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Fe´her (eds.), Political Legitimation in
Communist States (New York, St. Martin’s Press, ), p. .
 Frederick C. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conﬂict in China: From a Charismatic Mao to the
Politics of Succession (London, Macmillan, ), p. . Italics in the original.
 At the court of Louis XIV, ‘for the courtiers, especially the higher nobility’ attendance at
court was ‘virtually compulsory’, Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, p. .
 Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conﬂict in China, p. .
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origins of the fusion of royal and saintly identities in a Westmin-
ster Abbey which celebrated both Edward the Confessor and the
Plantagenets lay ‘somewhere within the speciﬁc institutional circles
which had nurtured the saint’s reputation in the ﬁrst place, namely
the Benedictines of Westminster and, perhaps, the immediate cir-
cle of the king. There never was, and never would be, a popular
cult.’
But just as autocratic rulers can be at least as dependent in their
legitimation on their administrative staff as representative ones, so
representative rulers, who because of their election might seem to
have less need to justify themselves, legitimate themselves within
the secret garden of government as energetically as do princes and
despots. There may be less difference than at ﬁrst appears between
monarchical and other absolute institutions of governments, and
democratic, liberal, representative and constitutional ones. Itmight
appear that the leadership of the latter is collective, that of the
former single or individual. But the solitary ruler is Alexander
Selkirk or King Lear, not a reigning monarch. There is a necessary
extension of even absolute rule beyond the immediate person of the
king, president, or general, just as, by contrast, there is a contraction
of democracy into the inner circle of the representative ruler. But, in
each case, legitimation is both collective and social, and individually
experienced.
LEADERS AND LED IN NATIONALISM
One instance which might seem seriously to qualify the claim that
rulers justify themselves to themselves as much if not more so than
they do to or in the sight of those whom they rule, is provided
by nationalist regimes. The leadership it might be argued justiﬁes
itself continuously to its following, and its principal claim is that it
represents that following. Legitimation is almost entirely exogen-
ous rather than endogenous, there is little if any self-referential
justiﬁcation, and there is an overwhelming emphasis on the link
between the people and their leaders. It is a claim which has been
subject to severely sceptical review by, in different ways, Russell
 Binski, Westminster Abbey and the Plantagenets, p. .
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Hardin who speaks of parasitic leaders, and Aijiz Ahmad, who
argues that national and ethnic identity is a myth exploited by a
few politicians and opportunists. There are good initial reasons
to be sceptical of the national or ethnic claim of leaders to speak
for a community of equals. As a form of legitimation, nationalism
familiarly presents the leader, party, soldier, or revolutionary as the
representative of the nation, the culture of the community or patria
politically expressed.Nationalism seeks exceptional representatives
of itsmundane virtues, and has a long history of fondness for heroes.
EricHobsbawm comments onMiroslavHroch’s three-stagemodel
of nationalism, where it is only in the third stage that the nationalist
elite turns to and enlists the masses, that the ‘ofﬁcial ideologies of
states andmovements are not guides to what is in the minds of even
the most loyal citizens or supporters’. But one might reply that
that indicates not so much the importance of the neglected people,
as their relative unimportance.
There are two dimensions of elitism involved in nationalism.
First, it is the elite which most fully represents the nation, which
expresses its distinctive character more fully than do ordinary peo-
ple. At a time of national danger or crisis, the nation’s interests
are frequently invested in one outstanding individual, to whose
judgements ordinary people must defer.WhenW. J.M.Mackenzie
commented of the subtitle of a book by Lucien Pye, Burma’s Search
for Identity, that ‘“Burma” is in no position to search for an iden-
tity unless it already has one’, the point was not, at least poten-
tially, simply negative. ‘Burma’ may not have been searching for
an identity, but somebody must have been. Princes and potentates,
or publicists and politicians, stand in for ﬁctional communities on
such occasions.
Second, not only do an elite or a leader normally possess the
magic symbols of nationalism, but the national message is directed
with especial force and articulacy to a minority. The greater the
numbers involved in its reception, the less frequently is the message
 Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London, Verso, ), pp. –;
Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conﬂict (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, ).
 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since  : Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge,
), p.  .
 W. J. M. Mackenzie, Political Identity (Harmondsworth: Penguin, ), p. .
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transmitted and the less its articulacy and complexity. This means
that many of the standard accounts miss the point: nationalism is
not only expressive of the values of an elite, it expresses those values
principally to an elite.
Is not this, however, simply an occasional feature of some nation-
alisms, rather than a regular characteristic of all? Do not twentieth-
century totalitarian regimes represent a different use of national-
ism, aimed principally at the masses? Is this not one of the ways
in which they differ from simple despotisms? Totalitarian regimes
have certainly directed a lot more propaganda at the masses than
have other kinds of regime. But the employment of nationalist
legitimation for and within the elite is also, correspondingly, in-
creased. It is not, in other words, the relative distribution of na-
tionalist messages of legitimacy which is changed in such regimes,
but the overall volume or amount of those messages. The nation-
alist propaganda of Nazi Germany was considerable, and in some
cases apparently speciﬁcally designed for mass consumption. Leni
Reifenstahl’s Triumph of the Will was not so much a ﬁlm of a party
rally, as a ﬁlm for which the rally was speciﬁcally stage managed.
The organisation of the rally was a part of the creation of the ﬁlm,
and the ritual for the party elite was subordinated to the creation of
images for mass consumption. But the closer one went to the heart
of the Nazi regime, the greater the amount of time and effort that
was spent on legitimation. Members of the SS spent far more time
on Nordic ﬂummery than ever did the ordinary subject of Nazi
Germany. Totalitarian regimes were in this respect typical of a
far wider spectrum of regimes. In even the most liberal and demo-
cratic regimes, presidents spend a greater proportion of their time at
formal, and closed, occasions of one kind and another – banquets,
receptions, ceremonies, ritual teˆte-a`-teˆtes with visiting dignitaries –
than ever they do on walkabouts in the street or the supermarket.
Totalitarian or populist nationalism is in this respect not so different
from democratic or constitutional versions. As the central symbol
of English or British nationalism, the larger part of the rituals and
ceremonials in which the queen participates are relatively or com-
pletely private. But since the queen is not a major political player,
 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, pp. – .
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these activities are signiﬁcant as legitimation, not for her, but for
others on whom she confers, or mirrors, the dignity of ofﬁce.
FORMS OF LEGITIMATION AND FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
One corrective to an impression of similarity in a ubiquitous self-
legitimation by rulers is provided by Weber’s suggestion about the
relation between the manner in which rulers legitimate themselves
and the manner of their rule. This frequently overlooked relation-
ship is presented as organic rather than mechanical or evidently
causal. It is of particular relevance at a time when worries are being
expressed amongst political scientists about the legitimation of the
European Union, and the governance of the European Union is
considered bymany to show serious ﬂaws.Most such discussion has
been of the ways in which those subject to the government of the
European Union might be normatively persuaded to comply. The
problem described has been how to legitimate subjecthood. What
has not been considered is the importance of legitimation not for
obedience or loyalty amongst citizens of the European Union, but
in shaping, restraining, and sustaining the manner of governance.
The question that is then raised is not, ‘Is the EuropeanUnion legit-
imate?’ but ‘What is associated with the particular ways in which it
legitimates itself ?’ The EuropeanUnionCommission in the period
leading up to themass resignation of commissioners inMarch 
was not endogenously un-legitimated. But it was legitimated in a
way which sustained, and was sustained by, unaccountability, high
self-regard which was not supported by any reference to polity, citi-
zens, or representatives, secrecy and lack of publicity, and a largely
inwardly referring referential framework. ‘What is relevant is the
image one has about oneself, and about the policy one is mak-
ing . . .That is what public interest is. Outside inﬂuences do not
weigh (very much).’ In other words, in terms ofWeber’s observed
occurrence and function of legitimation, legitimation was in the
 ‘Ofﬁcial ’, quoted in Liesbet Hooghe, ‘Images of Europe’, p. ; cf. Helen Wallace,
‘Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy for the EC’, in Soledad Garcia (ed.),
European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy (London, Pinter, ), p.  : ‘Reforms were
made periodically to the EC and its institutions. These did add to the trappings of
democratic form, but marginally so, leaving the patrician and technocratic processes
predominant.’
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ﬁrst place internal to government, not external. It was part of how
government was conducted, not part of the relations it had with
those whom it governed. But the manner of legitimation and the
character of government will be organically related.
THE FAILURE OF SELF-LEGITIMATION
Self-legitimation is necessary for rulers. The legitimation of the
unique identity of governers, and the legitimation of governers
by the enactment of their unique identity, is part of the contin-
ual rationalisation of rule. When this fails, government fails, it in
fact ceases to be government. A range of instances of this can be
found in studies of communist regimes in Eastern Europe both
in and before , which see the loss of conﬁdence, the failure
of self-justiﬁcation of rulers, as the key element. Well before the
collapse, in  , Joseph Rothschild argued that the importance
of the self-legitimation of ruling elites had been ignored: ‘Discus-
sions of legitimacy and legitimation risk irrelevancy if they overlook
this crucial dimension of a ruling elite’s sense of its legitimacy and
focus exclusively on the other dimension of the public’s or the
masses’ perceptions of that elite’s legitimacy.’ Five years before
the events of , Paul Lewis was suggesting that ‘it is elite dis-
integration and the failure of its internal mechanisms of authority
that have engendered the more general collapse of legitimacy and
the onset of political crises in communist Eastern Europe’. In
a discussion of East Germany in , Martin McCauley wrote
of ‘the self-deﬁned or self-ascriptive legitimacy based on the writ-
ings of Marx and Engels. If the umbilical cord linking the SED
to Marx were cut, the party would wither away.’ A similar view
was expressed at the same time by Jan Pakulski who argued that
‘Doctrinal consensus and the sense of legitimacy play a crucial
 I have left aside here the question of whether, or in what sense, institutions such as the
European Union can be considered as governments.
 J. Rothschild, ‘Observations on Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe’, Political
Science Quarterly ,  ( ), – , p.  .
 Paul G. Lewis (ed.), ‘Legitimation and Political Crises: East European Developments in
the Post-Stalin Period’ in Paul G. Lewis (ed.), Eastern Europe: Political Crisis and Legitimation,
pp. – (London, Croom Helm, ), p. .
 Martin McCauley (ed.), ‘Legitimation in the German Democratic Republic’ in Lewis
(ed.), Eastern Europe, p. .
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role in unifying elites and cementing the links between the leaders
and the political-administrative apparata.’ With the collapse of
communist regimes across Eastern Europe in , Pakulski was
able to apply the general point to the Polish example: ‘Ideological
disintegration of the elite-apparatus and the loss of Soviet support
heralded the collapse of the regime and started a massive social
transformation.’ Such accounts presented the events of  as
an internal failure, rather than principally the result of external,
popular pressure. LeslieHolmes summed up the argument in retro-
spect. ‘If the whole, or at least most of the key elements, of the elite
loses faith in what it is doing and in the very system it is supposed to
maintain – if there is near-universal collapse of self-legitimation –
then the fourth form of legitimation crisis has occurred. In many
ways, this concept provides one of the most important and persua-
sive explanations of the collapse of communism.’
Such an account of the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern
Europe in  departs from the democratic assumptions of much
political science. There are two counter-narratives. The ﬁrst, the
relatively weaker response, argues that the loss of self-conﬁdence in
the ruling elite was vital, but that the elite lost conﬁdence only be-
cause of popular protest. An interesting application of this insight
can be found in the discussion, though not in the arguments, of Jan
Kubik, who suggests that the development of counter-legitimations
by opposition groups inPolandbefore  facilitated the change of
policy by the communist ruling group. The second and stronger
response is that the elite’s loss of self-conﬁdence was nomore than a
registering of a notice of dismissal that had already effectively been
delivered by the people, so was of no consequence. A third, and
subtle, variant is the argument that the elite’s loss of conﬁdence
can actually stimulate the development of counter-legitimations.
 Jan Pakulski, ‘Ideology and Political Domination: A Critical Re-appraisal’, International
Journal of Comparative Sociology , – ( ), – , p. .
 Jan Pakulski, ‘Poland: Ideology, Legitimacy and Political Domination’ in Nicholas
Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner (eds.), Dominant Ideologies (London,
Unwin Hyman, ), p. ; cf. Jan Pakulski, ‘East European Revolutions and “Legiti-
macy Crisis”’ in Janina Frentzel-Zago´rska (ed.), From a One-Party State to Democracy, –
(Amsterdam, Rodopi, ).
 Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity,  ), p. .
 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall
of State Socialism in Poland (Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, ).
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Mancur Olson argues somewhat along these lines, not with re-
spect to the mass of the population, but with respect to the middle
and lower-range ofﬁcials of the regime. If these arms and legs of
the regime lose conﬁdence in it, then the way is open for control
to evaporate. ‘Accordingly, when there is a successful insurrection
against an autocratic regime, I hypothesize that it is normally due
to the problems, divisions, irresolutions, or other weaknesses of
the regime, not because of an increase in the animosity of the
population.’
The implications of these argumentsmight seem to be discourag-
ing for democrats, though advocates of a broadly democratic theory
of legitimation such as David Beetham and Christopher Lord have
given them guarded acknowledgement. But the discouragement
is more apparent than real. Democratic protests were clearly an el-
ement in the events of , and Di Palma has offered consolation
to democrats by arguing that regimes which are self-legitimating,
and which lack popular normative support, which are not demo-
cratically legitimated, are uniquely vulnerable. What Di Palma
calls legitimation from the top is, he argues, a distinctive form of
legitimation, found in regimes which cannot convincingly claim
that they have emerged or been sustained as a result of democratic
choice. But a different observation is that legitimation from the
top is a feature of all regimes, not just of despotisms. There is then a
gradient of legitimation and identiﬁcation, and the conﬁdence, and
the crises of conﬁdence, are more important the closer the heart
of the activity of government is approached. If legitimacy is more
important for rulers than for subjects and citizens, so is the collapse
of legitimacy. The failure or weakening of legitimation becomes
 Mancur Olson, ‘The Logic of Collective Action in Soviet-type Societies’, Journal of Soviet
Nationalities  (Summer ), – , pp. –.
 Beetham and Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union, p. : ‘Analysts of political legiti-
macy fromMaxWeber onwards have argued about whether the recognition or acknowl-
edgement of a regime’s legitimacy is only important to the behaviour of its elites or
administrative staff, rather than of subjects more widely. Naturally, any regime is particu-
larly dependent on the co-operation of its own ofﬁcials, and their acknowledgment of its
authority is therefore especially important. Yet it is rare in the contemporary world for
subjects to be so powerless that a regime can dispense with anywider claims to legitimacy.’
The use of the word ‘rare’ is a small qualiﬁcation through which a major qualiﬁcation of
the argument could intrude.
 Di Palma, ‘Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society’, pp. – .
 Ibid., pp. – .
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more important the further up the institutional tree one climbs.
All regimes are characterised by legitimation from the top, and all
rulers therefore suffer when top-down legitimation, endogenous
self-legitimation, fails. Legitimation and the collapse of legitima-
tionmay affect the allegiance of subjects. It is crucial to the internal
health and survival of ruling groups. The most serious legitimacy
crisis for any group of rulers will be that which occurs, not amongst
its subjects, but amongst its own ranks. Regimes can survive an ab-
sence, failure or collapse of legitimation amongst their subjects.
They cannot survive a collapse of legitimation within the person-
nel of government. When subjects lose faith in rulers, government
becomes difﬁcult. When rulers lose conﬁdence in themselves, it
becomes impossible.
IS LEGITIMATION A PRIVATE GAME?
If there is a form of legitimation carried on away from the public
gaze, and for the satisfaction of rulers rather than of subjects, is
this activity any more than a private game of government? Does it
have any consequences for either the way in which government is
conducted or its impact on those who are ruled by it? The question
has been raised in a related context by David Cannadine, when he
asks of his own jointly edited collection of studies of royal ritual, ‘But
to what end? To say of pomp and pageantry that there has always
been a great deal of it about, and here are some more examples,
albeit from unusually exotic locations, is not of itself particularly
signiﬁcant.’ There are two principal answers. The ﬁrst is that any
activity to which humans devote a regular and signiﬁcant amount
of attention is prima facie of importance for students of human
society. Time, energy, and resources go on what, from a limited
 J. Pakulski, ‘Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reﬂections on Max Weber and Soviet-
Type Societies’, British Journal of Political Science, ,  (), –; Pakulski, ‘Poland’;
J. Pakulski, ‘Ideology and Political Domination: A Critical Re-appraisal’, International
Journal of Comparative Sociology , – ( ), – ; N. Abercrombie and B. S. Turner,
‘The Dominant Ideology Thesis’ in Anthony Giddens and David Held (eds.), Classes,
Power, andConﬂict: Classical andContemporaryDebates (London, ); Abercrombie,Hill, and
Turner (eds.), Dominant Ideologies; J. Rothschild, ‘Political Legitimacy in Contemporary
Europe’ in B. Denitch (ed.), Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks for Analysis
(Beverley Hills, Sage, ).
 Cannadine, ‘Introduction: Divine Rites of Kings’, p. .
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perspective, is a non-functional aspects of government. But the
judgement of non-functionality is deductive not inductive. The raw
material, in such an instance, sets the perimeters of the enquiry,
and not vice versa. The second answer is that since government
is a game with public consequences, it matters very much how it
is carried on, with what justiﬁcations, self-descriptions, and hoped
for or believed in identiﬁcations. Looking at government from the
centre outwards by focusing on endogenous legitimation, the self-
legitimation of rulers, will not give a ‘correct’ account, nor will it
supersede ‘incorrect’ accounts, but it will add an extra dimension,
and give a fuller, more rounded, description.
But however self-regarding the legitimation of rulers may be,
they do not act alone. If they did so, they would not be rulers.
The difference between a king in ofﬁce and a king in exile is that
the latter has no subjects. There are not only subjects, but mighty
subjects who demand particular attention, and rebels who engage
in a legitimation of their own, as well as ordinary subjects who are
never entirely excluded. Their relation to the legitimation of rulers,
and their own identiﬁcations and legitimations will be considered
in the remaining chapters.
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